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Article 9

When Did I Begin?A Reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini
Rev. Dr. Norman Ford, S.D.B., S.T.L., Ph.D.

I would like to reply to Nicholas Tonti-Filippini's recent Critical Note on
my book When Did I Begin ? Conception of the Human Individual in
His/ory, Philosophy and Scien ce (Cambridge University Press, 1988).1 He
correctly states the thesis that represents the conclusion of my book and
agrees with much of what I have written . He shows no signs, however, of
having grasped the thrust of the central line of my reasoning and he fails to
mention some of my crucial arguments. Rather than refer directly to
particular sentences of his , I think it would be better to answer his critique of
my thesis by presenting a brief outline of why I concluded that a human
individual could not begin before the appearance of the primitive streak
about 14 days after fertilization.
In an era of reproductive technology, it is no longer an idle academic
question to ask when the life of a human individual begins. The answer
given to this question is relevant to the morality of those methods of
preventing pregnancy whose action may be abortifacient. It is more
pressing still to know what is involved when human embryos are frozen in
some programmes of in vitro fertilization . Debates on the moral status of
the human embryo and the appropriate legislative action required to give
due protection to human embryos make it imperative to study the question
thoroughly for the emergence of the truth.
An inter-disciplinary approach involving philosophy, scientific embryology and history is required. Science is quite relevant even though it
more properly pertains to philosophy to determine questions about the
meaning and beginning of human personhood. Philosophical induction
cannot afford to neglect any facts of scientific embryology, even though not
all the scientific facts may be equally significant in the final analysis .
Whoever wishes to master these issues must become acquainted with both
disciplines . Laudable pro-life objectives in today's world cannot be
effectively promoted by unproven statements on when a person begins. A
responsible search for truth does not undermine Catholic moral teaching
provided the respect due to early human embryos is upheld . The challenge
to write convincing arguments to protect human life from conception must
be taken up seriously for our contemporaries.
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The Catholic Church's Position
The Catholic Church has always adopted the commonly accepted wellinformed view of the scientists and philosophers of the day concerning the
beginning of the human person. At present the Church takes for granted the
view held by most in the community that the zygote , formed from the union
of sperm and egg, is already a human being but has expressly not committed
her authority to this affirmation. At the same time the Church rightly
realizes that wherever there are reasonable doubts about the personal status
of the early embryo, moral principles, without prejudice to the search for
truth, require that the human embryo be treated as a person from
conception. I fully concur with all the teachings of the Instruction "Donum
Vitae", especially the following passages :
... T he conclusions of scie nce regarding the human embryo provide valuable
indications. from which by the use of reason . it is possible to discern that a person
is already present from the first appearance of human life: how could a living
human creature not also be a human person? The magisterium of the church has
expressly not committed its authority co ncerning this affirmation which properly
pertains to philosophy, but it constantly reaffirms its moral condemnation of any
kind of procured abortion. This teaching has not been changed and is
unchangeable .
Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that
is to say from the moment the formation of the zygote begins . demands the
unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his[her] bodily and
spiritual totality.
A human creature is to be respected and treated as a person from conception ;
and therefore from that same time his[her] rights as a person must be recognised.
among which in the first place is the in violable right to life of each innocent human
creature.'

Philosophical Considerations
Soul and matter are one, constituting the characteristic psychosomatic
unity of the human individual , a living human body and a unique
ontological entity. It is not a question of finding out when a human
individual begins to have personal experiences of his or her worth, or begins
to be a moral agent after attaining the age of reason. It is not simply a matter
of establishing when each one's genetic individuality begins. It is well known
that this occurs at fertilization. It is more a matter offinding out how far one
can trace back one's identity as the same continuing living body or living
ontological individual. A living ontological individual is actually organized
as a distinct heterogeneous being who is not an aggregate of smaller living
cells nor merely a part of a greater integrated whole.
Although all the cells in our bodies are genetically identical, each one is
not a distinct ontological individual. There is only one human individual
the really exists in the primary sense of actual existence, though there are
many cells which share in the existence of that single living human being. A
human person is a distinct living onto logical individual with a truly human
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nature. A human person cannot exist before the formation of a distinct
living individual with a truly human nature which retains the same
ontological identity throughout its successive developmental stages. The
adult is the same ontological individual as the infant and even the fetus prior
to birth. It is a question of considering the relevant biological evidence to see
if there is a stage in embryological development before which there could
not be an ongoing individual living body with a truly human nature.
The Case for a Human Person Beginning at Fertilization
It is commonly held that a human person begins at fertilization when the
union of the sperm and egg give rise to a single-cell human embryo, a
zygote , whose unique genetic individuality remains unchanged during
normal development. Because cell divisons and differentiation required for
the coordinated development and growth of the human individual are
programmed from conception, it is argued the zygote already is a human
individual. These facts, coupled with unidirectional development and
growth, are thought to suffice to establish the human zygote as the one and
same living being as the future human adult. According to this account the
zygote is an actual human individual and not simply a potential human
person in much the same way as an infant is an actual human person with
potential to develop to maturity.
When identical twinning occurs at the two-cell stage either the first
human individual ceases when it divides and two new human individuals
begin, or the original human individual continues when a newly formed
twin begins. There is no logical reason why one living individual cannot give
origin to another without continuing to exist as the same ontological
individual. I agree with Tonti-Filippini that it is metaphysically possible for
an individual to give rise to another individual without ceasing to exist. A
tree cutting may give rise to another tree of the same type while the original
tree continues to exist.
The Case Against a Human Person Beginning at Fertilization

In my book, I argue philosophically on the basis of evidence drawn from
scientific embryology that this widely held traditional view may be coherent,
but not necessarily true. Although the zygote is endowed with human genetic
individuality and its cell progeny may give rise to a human adult, it does not
follow that the zygote itself is a human individual. The fact that identical
twinning may occasionally occur when the zygote divides, raises the question
whether the zygote is, or is not, a human individual. In theory, abstracting
from the concrete biological reality, it is possible to argue that the zygote
retains its ontological identity when it divides to give origin to a second
identical cell. In this hypothesis, if the zygote already is a human individual, a
two-celled human individual would be present after the first cleavage, and a
multicellular human individual throughout subsequent cleavages.
November, 1990
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Tonti-Filippini does not see why the comparison of the tree with the
human zygote fails on biological, not metaphysical, grounds. The
biological structures of the tree and the human zygote reveal the essential
differences which are relevant to determining whether the original
individual zygote survives the twinning process when a second identical cell
begins. It is obvious the central organization and structure of a tree remain
after a cutting is taken from it. The same applies to a human individual
when both legs and arms are amputated. Tonti-Filippini is right in saying
the same person continues despite the loss of these non-vital parts. Likewise
the ontological identity of a human person is not affected when one
produces living sperm or eggs which exist for a short time as living
individuals. A human individual would not cease to be the same entity even
if it were possible to replicate him / her by producing a clone from one of
his / her cells.
Contemporary scientific embryology has established that once the DN A
content of the 23 pairs of original male and female single thread
chromosomes is replicated, the fertilized ovum has 23 pairs of double
threaded male and female chromosomes. After some hours, cell division
and cleavage begin with the random sharing of the original and replicated
chromatid threads from each pair, so that the parent cell is no longer
present once the first two daughter cells are formed. It no longer exists once
it shares its cytoplasm and chromosomal genetic material to give rise to its
identical daughter cells of equal age. The analogy of the amoeba serves
better than that of the tree cutting:
The case of an amoeba or a bacterial ce ll becomi ng two by fission would be the
appropriate analogy to employ in the case of identical twinning in human zygotes.
The original parent cell lo ses its ontological individuality and ceases to exist when
two offspring result from the equal sharing of its genetic material. The parent
individual actually ceases to exist when th e two new ones begin to exist ]

Neither of the daughter cells is the same one, the same ontological
individual, as the parent cell , though they are genetically identical to the
parent cell. The zygote becomes two independent cells, two living
individuals, each of which begins a new life-cycle within the zona pel/ucida,
a protective cover composed of non-living glyco-proteins in non-cellular
form. The zygote could not be a human person if it is not the same
continuing individual entity as the first two cells after the first mitotic
division. The evidence does not support the view that the zygote itself
continues as one living individual with the same central organization after
the first mitotic division. Two contiguous identical cells do not constitute
one living individual. The required continuity of ontological identity from
zygote to early embryo is not there, and much less from zygote to fetus ,
infant, and human adult.
A Human Person Present Before Definitive Individuation?

Each human adult has a body with millions of cells , but
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multicellular human individual. If I am right, sometime after the two-cell
stage a living human individual must be formed . This is often referred to as
individuation. With the second mitotic division there are four distinct,
contiguous, genetically identical cells within the zona pellucida. Each lives
and behaves as an individual , drawing on nutrients from its cytoplasm and
the surrounding fluids to provide its energy requirements.
At the four-cell stage, each cell is still totipotent, i.e. , given a favorable
environment, each has the capacity to generate the cell progeny required for
the complete individual human offspring. Soon after this stage totipotency
is restricted to groups of cells. Evidence for this may be had from the
phenomenon of identical twinning which in the human may occur naturally
anytime from the two cell stage up to the appearance of the primitive streak ,
about 14 days after fertilization. If a genetically unique human zygote is not
the same ontological individual as one or both of its identical daughter cells ,
it could not be so for the resulting blastocyst , fetus and child ,
notwithstanding the continuity of the same biological identity at each stage
of development. Genetic identity of human cells must not be confused with
the ontological identity of human individuals. Human twins may be
genetically identical but they are certainly distinct ontological individuals.
Intercellular communication and cell differentiation begin to appear in
the human from about the eight-cell stage onwards, but especially after the
cells compact to form a cluster of cells called a morula. This maximizes cell
surface contact. Some argue that these goal-directed activities are a sign the
early human embryonic cells already have the requisite ongoing unity
required for the actual constitution of a human individual. Goal directed
activities of cells, however, are perfectly compatible with a multiplicity of
cells that are distinct individuals . Think of the continuous goal directed
activities of the sperm from its binding to the surface of the zona pellucida
to penetration and the complete fusion of both gametes to form a new
individual cell at syngamy. Nobody suggests the sperm bound to the outside
of the zona pellucida constitutes a new cell to form a zygote . Intercellular
goal directed activities alone do not prove the cells constitute a living
multicellular individual.
The occupation by some cells of an inner or outer position in the morula
plays a great part in determining differentiation and consequently cells'
developmental pathways and final destiny. These chance factors do have
some bearing on differentiation and the formation of the definitive
individual by activating certain genes and not others . The flexibility of
movement and allocation of cells as distinct entities argues strongly against
the morula being a single human individual.
Experiments with mice show how single cells taken from three separate
early mouse embryos can be aggregated to form a single viable chimeric
mouse with characteristics of all three parent embryos . The three gentically
dissimilar cells and their progeny collaborated to form the chimeric mouse .
In this case , the resultant chimeric mouse certainly did not begin at the
zygote stage . This suggests that in the normal situation. genetically similar
November, 1990
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cell progency of a zygote subsequently form the definitive individual body,
be it that of a mouse or a human individual.
Prior to the early blastocyst stage, the developing cells do not
differentiate sufficiently to determine which cells will form the
extraembryonic membranes (e.g. , placenta) and those which will form the
inner cell mass, from which will develop the embryo proper and fetus.
Animal experiments show that by the late blastocyst stage when the inner
cell mass is already formed, it is not yet determined which cells' progeny will
give rise to the definitive embryo proper which will develop and grow into
the fetus. A human individual could not be present before it is actually
formed. The traditional insight over the centuries remains ever valid: a
potential human individual cannot be an actual human individual. There
can be no person before the formation of a distinct on-going individual
human body.
A Human Person Begins with the Formation of the Primitive Streak?

With the appearance of the primitive streak at the completion of
implantation some 14 days after fertilization a symmetrical body plan along
the craniocaudal axis for every human individual is established, including
cases of identical twinning. The multicellular human individual formed at
this stage remains the same ongoing human being without loss of identity
until death . The primitive streak represents the formation of a definitive
individual and the restriction of the developmental potency of the zygote's
cell progeny to the building up of a single individual in all eutherian
mammals , including humans. Consequently identical twinning can no
longer occur after this stage . Conjoined identical twins are formed if two
primitive streaks in part develop as one.
Prior to this stage, it seems unreal to speak of the presence of a distinct
human individual. This suggests that before this stage, genetically human
embryonic cells could not form an ongoing human individual with a true
human nature. In short, I argue in my book that one or more human
individuals could not actually exist before one or more human bodies are
formed . I further argue that once the human individual is formed , a human
being with a rational nature is constituted by the creative power of God.
Not all will agree with my thesis and much time may be required for the
truth to emerge with certainty. The zygote has the genetic code and
organization required for the eventual formation of one or more human
individuals, but this does not suffice to constitute an actual human
individual , despite the continuity of genetic identity. Life may be a
continuous process, but distinct individuals do begin and end their lives.
Though the debate is far from over, it appears fertilization is not the
beginning of the development of the human individual. but rather,
represents the beginning of the process of the zygote's cell progeny

becoming one or more human individuals.
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4 Some Moral Implications of My Thesis
I agree with the teaching of"Humanae Vitae" that the Creator's plan for
the responsible transmission of human life as the fruit of an act of conjugal
love should not be intentionally frustrated . Hence even if it were certain tha t
the early human embryo was not a perso n, I would morally disapprove of
interrupting the generative process by aborting preimplanted huma n
embryos and destructive experiments on human embryos.
In cases of rape , it is morally permissi ble to prevent conception 4 Hence it
is necessa ry to know how long after the attack it is morall y permissible to
attempt to prevent conception as distinct from destro ying or aborting the
early human embryo to prevent pregnancy. If my thesis were to be proven
to be correct, it would be necessary to di stinguish betwee n homicidal a nd
non-homicidal abortion. This does not imply any moral support for
fornication or contraception against the teaching of "Humanae Vitae" or
for any form of abortion, even if the malice of homicide is absent. At the
same time it would be necessary to distinguish the kind of moral ma lice
invo lved in each of these cases, especially in difficult pastoral counseling
situation s. In the mea ntime the benefit of a ny rea sonable doubt about the
persona l status of the early human embryo must be resolved by trea ting the
human embryo as a person from conception .
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